111 lines
5.0 KiB
Markdown
111 lines
5.0 KiB
Markdown
# Security Considerations
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 1. Overview
|
||
This document analyzes the security of passwords generated by the application, which uses the following parameters:
|
||
- Length: 32 characters
|
||
- Character set: Uppercase letters (A-Z), lowercase letters (a-z), digits (0-9)
|
||
- No special characters (equivalent to `apg -a 1 -m 32 -n 1 -M NCL`)
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 2. Keyspace Analysis
|
||
### 2.1. Character Set and Length
|
||
- Character set size: 26 (uppercase) + 26 (lowercase) + 10 (digits) = **62 possible characters per position**.
|
||
- Password length: 32 characters.
|
||
|
||
### 2.2. Total Keyspace
|
||
The total number of possible passwords is calculated as:
|
||
62^32 ≈ 1.46 × 10^57
|
||
This means there are **1.46 decillion** possible combinations.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 3. Brute-Force Resistance
|
||
### 3.1. Average Number of Guesses
|
||
On average, an attacker would need to try half of the keyspace to guess the correct password:
|
||
(62^32) / 2 ≈ 7.3 × 10^56 attempts
|
||
|
||
### 3.2. Time to Crack on Modern Hardware
|
||
| Hardware | Hashes per Second | Time to Exhaust Keyspace |
|
||
|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------|
|
||
| Modern CPU | 10 billion | 7.3 × 10^46 seconds | ≈ 2.3 × 10^39 years |
|
||
| Modern GPU | 100 billion | 7.3 × 10^45 seconds | ≈ 2.3 × 10^38 years |
|
||
|
||
**Note**: Even with massive parallelization (e.g., botnets or supercomputers), brute-forcing a 32-character password from this keyspace is practically infeasible.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 4. Comparison with Shorter Passwords
|
||
| Length | Keyspace (62 Characters) | Average Guesses | Time on GPU (100 GigaHashes/s) |
|
||
|--------|--------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
|
||
| 16 | 4.7 × 10^28 | 2.35 × 10^28 | ~74 years |
|
||
| 24 | 1.3 × 10^43 | 6.5 × 10^42 | ~2.1 million years |
|
||
| 32 | 1.46 × 10^57 | 7.3 × 10^56 | ~2.3 trillion years |
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 5. Threat Model
|
||
### 5.1. Brute-Force Attacks
|
||
- **Conclusion**: Brute-force attacks are not a viable threat for 32-character passwords.
|
||
- **Mitigation**: Ensure the system enforces rate-limiting to prevent automated guessing.
|
||
|
||
### 5.2. Social Engineering and Side-Channel Attacks
|
||
- **Social Engineering**: Phishing, keyloggers, or shoulder surfing are more realistic threats than brute-force attacks.
|
||
- **Side-Channel Attacks**: Timing attacks or power analysis could theoretically reduce security if the password verification is poorly implemented.
|
||
- **Mitigation**: Use constant-time comparison functions for password verification.
|
||
|
||
### 5.3. Password Storage
|
||
- **Hashing**: Always store passwords using strong, adaptive hashing algorithms like:
|
||
- Argon2 (recommended for new systems)
|
||
- bcrypt or PBKDF2 (with high work factors)
|
||
- **Salting**: Use a unique salt per password to prevent rainbow table attacks.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 6. Practical Recommendations
|
||
### 6.1. For Users
|
||
- **Password Managers**: Encourage the use of password managers to store and manage generated passwords.
|
||
- **Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)**: Always enable MFA where possible to add an extra layer of security.
|
||
|
||
### 6.2. For Developers
|
||
- **Rate Limiting**: Implement rate limiting on authentication endpoints to slow down brute-force attempts.
|
||
- **Secure Transmission**: Ensure passwords are transmitted over TLS/SSL to prevent interception.
|
||
- **Password Policies**: Enforce policies that discourage password reuse and encourage regular updates.
|
||
|
||
### 6.3. For DFIR and Incident Response
|
||
- **Logging and Monitoring**: Log failed login attempts and monitor for unusual activity.
|
||
- **Incident Response Plan**: Have a plan in place for compromised accounts, including forced password resets and user notification.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 7. Additional Considerations
|
||
### 7.1. Extended Character Set
|
||
If special characters are included (e.g., !@#$%^&*), the keyspace increases to:
|
||
72^32 ≈ 1.9 × 10^60
|
||
This further improves security but is not necessary for most use cases given the already massive keyspace.
|
||
|
||
### 7.2. Entropy Calculation
|
||
The entropy of a 32-character password from a 62-character set is:
|
||
log2(62^32) ≈ 192.6 bits
|
||
This exceeds the 128-bit security level recommended by NIST for cryptographic applications.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 8. Conclusion
|
||
The passwords generated by this application are extremely secure against brute-force attacks due to their length and character diversity. The primary risks lie in human factors (e.g., phishing, reuse) and implementation flaws (e.g., weak hashing, lack of rate limiting).
|
||
|
||
For DFIR and high-security environments, combine these passwords with:
|
||
- Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)
|
||
- Regular audits of authentication logs
|
||
- User education on social engineering risks
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## 9. References
|
||
- [NIST Special Publication 800-63B](https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html) (Digital Identity Guidelines)
|
||
- [OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html)
|
||
- [Argon2: The Memory-Hard Function for Password Hashing](https://github.com/P-H-C/phc-winner-argon2)
|
||
|