2nd try with registry_url non hard coded

README.md

@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
+# Web-Password
+
+_a web based password generator_
+
+![App Screenshot](img/screenshot.png)
 
 # Funktionsweise
 
@@ -24,3 +29,27 @@ docker build -t password-generator .
 docker run -p 8080:8080 password-generator
 ```
 
+## mit docker-compose
+
+Ein `docker-compose.yml` wird mitgeliefert.
+
+### initial pull
+
+```
+docker compose login gitea.scu.si
+docker compose pull
+```
+
+### start up
+
+```
+docker compose up -d
+```
+
+### bring down
+
+```
+docker compose down
+```
+
+

SECURITY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+# Security Considerations
+
+---
+
+## 1. Overview
+This document analyzes the security of passwords generated by the application, which uses the following parameters:
+- Length: 32 characters
+- Character set: Uppercase letters (A-Z), lowercase letters (a-z), digits (0-9)
+- No special characters (equivalent to `apg -a 1 -m 32 -n 1 -M NCL`)
+
+---
+
+## 2. Keyspace Analysis
+### 2.1. Character Set and Length
+- Character set size: 26 (uppercase) + 26 (lowercase) + 10 (digits) = **62 possible characters per position**.
+- Password length: 32 characters.
+
+### 2.2. Total Keyspace
+The total number of possible passwords is calculated as:
+62^32 ≈ 1.46 × 10^57
+This means there are **1.46 decillion** possible combinations.
+
+---
+
+## 3. Brute-Force Resistance
+### 3.1. Average Number of Guesses
+On average, an attacker would need to try half of the keyspace to guess the correct password:
+(62^32) / 2 ≈ 7.3 × 10^56 attempts
+
+### 3.2. Time to Crack on Modern Hardware
+| Hardware          | Hashes per Second | Time to Exhaust Keyspace       |
+|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------|
+| Modern CPU        | 10 billion        | 7.3 × 10^46 seconds            | ≈ 2.3 × 10^39 years            |
+| Modern GPU        | 100 billion       | 7.3 × 10^45 seconds            | ≈ 2.3 × 10^38 years            |
+
+**Note**: Even with massive parallelization (e.g., botnets or supercomputers), brute-forcing a 32-character password from this keyspace is practically infeasible.
+
+---
+
+## 4. Comparison with Shorter Passwords
+| Length | Keyspace (62 Characters) | Average Guesses       | Time on GPU (100 GigaHashes/s) |
+|--------|--------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
+| 16     | 4.7 × 10^28              | 2.35 × 10^28          | ~74 years                      |
+| 24     | 1.3 × 10^43              | 6.5 × 10^42           | ~2.1 million years            |
+| 32     | 1.46 × 10^57             | 7.3 × 10^56           | ~2.3 trillion years            |
+
+---
+
+## 5. Threat Model
+### 5.1. Brute-Force Attacks
+- **Conclusion**: Brute-force attacks are not a viable threat for 32-character passwords.
+- **Mitigation**: Ensure the system enforces rate-limiting to prevent automated guessing.
+
+### 5.2. Social Engineering and Side-Channel Attacks
+- **Social Engineering**: Phishing, keyloggers, or shoulder surfing are more realistic threats than brute-force attacks.
+- **Side-Channel Attacks**: Timing attacks or power analysis could theoretically reduce security if the password verification is poorly implemented.
+  - **Mitigation**: Use constant-time comparison functions for password verification.
+
+### 5.3. Password Storage
+- **Hashing**: Always store passwords using strong, adaptive hashing algorithms like:
+  - Argon2 (recommended for new systems)
+  - bcrypt or PBKDF2 (with high work factors)
+- **Salting**: Use a unique salt per password to prevent rainbow table attacks.
+
+---
+
+## 6. Practical Recommendations
+### 6.1. For Users
+- **Password Managers**: Encourage the use of password managers to store and manage generated passwords.
+- **Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)**: Always enable MFA where possible to add an extra layer of security.
+
+### 6.2. For Developers
+- **Rate Limiting**: Implement rate limiting on authentication endpoints to slow down brute-force attempts.
+- **Secure Transmission**: Ensure passwords are transmitted over TLS/SSL to prevent interception.
+- **Password Policies**: Enforce policies that discourage password reuse and encourage regular updates.
+
+### 6.3. For DFIR and Incident Response
+- **Logging and Monitoring**: Log failed login attempts and monitor for unusual activity.
+- **Incident Response Plan**: Have a plan in place for compromised accounts, including forced password resets and user notification.
+
+---
+
+## 7. Additional Considerations
+### 7.1. Extended Character Set
+If special characters are included (e.g., !@#$%^&*), the keyspace increases to:
+72^32 ≈ 1.9 × 10^60
+This further improves security but is not necessary for most use cases given the already massive keyspace.
+
+### 7.2. Entropy Calculation
+The entropy of a 32-character password from a 62-character set is:
+log2(62^32) ≈ 192.6 bits
+This exceeds the 128-bit security level recommended by NIST for cryptographic applications.
+
+---
+
+## 8. Conclusion
+The passwords generated by this application are extremely secure against brute-force attacks due to their length and character diversity. The primary risks lie in human factors (e.g., phishing, reuse) and implementation flaws (e.g., weak hashing, lack of rate limiting).
+
+For DFIR and high-security environments, combine these passwords with:
+- Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)
+- Regular audits of authentication logs
+- User education on social engineering risks
+
+---
+
+## 9. References
+- [NIST Special Publication 800-63B](https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html) (Digital Identity Guidelines)
+- [OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html)
+- [Argon2: The Memory-Hard Function for Password Hashing](https://github.com/P-H-C/phc-winner-argon2)
+