5.0 KiB
Security Considerations
1. Overview
This document analyzes the security of passwords generated by the application, which uses the following parameters:
- Length: 32 characters
- Character set: Uppercase letters (A-Z), lowercase letters (a-z), digits (0-9)
- No special characters (equivalent to
apg -a 1 -m 32 -n 1 -M NCL)
2. Keyspace Analysis
2.1. Character Set and Length
- Character set size: 26 (uppercase) + 26 (lowercase) + 10 (digits) = 62 possible characters per position.
- Password length: 32 characters.
2.2. Total Keyspace
The total number of possible passwords is calculated as: 62^32 ≈ 1.46 × 10^57 This means there are 1.46 decillion possible combinations.
3. Brute-Force Resistance
3.1. Average Number of Guesses
On average, an attacker would need to try half of the keyspace to guess the correct password: (62^32) / 2 ≈ 7.3 × 10^56 attempts
3.2. Time to Crack on Modern Hardware
| Hardware | Hashes per Second | Time to Exhaust Keyspace |
|---|---|---|
| Modern CPU | 10 billion | 7.3 × 10^46 seconds |
| Modern GPU | 100 billion | 7.3 × 10^45 seconds |
Note: Even with massive parallelization (e.g., botnets or supercomputers), brute-forcing a 32-character password from this keyspace is practically infeasible.
4. Comparison with Shorter Passwords
| Length | Keyspace (62 Characters) | Average Guesses | Time on GPU (100 GigaHashes/s) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 16 | 4.7 × 10^28 | 2.35 × 10^28 | ~74 years |
| 24 | 1.3 × 10^43 | 6.5 × 10^42 | ~2.1 million years |
| 32 | 1.46 × 10^57 | 7.3 × 10^56 | ~2.3 trillion years |
5. Threat Model
5.1. Brute-Force Attacks
- Conclusion: Brute-force attacks are not a viable threat for 32-character passwords.
- Mitigation: Ensure the system enforces rate-limiting to prevent automated guessing.
5.2. Social Engineering and Side-Channel Attacks
- Social Engineering: Phishing, keyloggers, or shoulder surfing are more realistic threats than brute-force attacks.
- Side-Channel Attacks: Timing attacks or power analysis could theoretically reduce security if the password verification is poorly implemented.
- Mitigation: Use constant-time comparison functions for password verification.
5.3. Password Storage
- Hashing: Always store passwords using strong, adaptive hashing algorithms like:
- Argon2 (recommended for new systems)
- bcrypt or PBKDF2 (with high work factors)
- Salting: Use a unique salt per password to prevent rainbow table attacks.
6. Practical Recommendations
6.1. For Users
- Password Managers: Encourage the use of password managers to store and manage generated passwords.
- Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Always enable MFA where possible to add an extra layer of security.
6.2. For Developers
- Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting on authentication endpoints to slow down brute-force attempts.
- Secure Transmission: Ensure passwords are transmitted over TLS/SSL to prevent interception.
- Password Policies: Enforce policies that discourage password reuse and encourage regular updates.
6.3. For DFIR and Incident Response
- Logging and Monitoring: Log failed login attempts and monitor for unusual activity.
- Incident Response Plan: Have a plan in place for compromised accounts, including forced password resets and user notification.
7. Additional Considerations
7.1. Extended Character Set
If special characters are included (e.g., !@#$%^&*), the keyspace increases to: 72^32 ≈ 1.9 × 10^60 This further improves security but is not necessary for most use cases given the already massive keyspace.
7.2. Entropy Calculation
The entropy of a 32-character password from a 62-character set is: log2(62^32) ≈ 192.6 bits This exceeds the 128-bit security level recommended by NIST for cryptographic applications.
8. Conclusion
The passwords generated by this application are extremely secure against brute-force attacks due to their length and character diversity. The primary risks lie in human factors (e.g., phishing, reuse) and implementation flaws (e.g., weak hashing, lack of rate limiting).
For DFIR and high-security environments, combine these passwords with:
- Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)
- Regular audits of authentication logs
- User education on social engineering risks
9. References
- NIST Special Publication 800-63B (Digital Identity Guidelines)
- OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet
- Argon2: The Memory-Hard Function for Password Hashing